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Institutional Investors and Shareholder Litigation

机译:机构投资者与股东诉讼

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摘要

We examine whether institutional investors are able to avoid future litigation. Our results show that institutions provide a fiduciary role by decreasing or eliminating their positions in sued firms well before litigation begins. We also find that institutional groups with high monitoring ability (independent investment advisors and mutual funds) are more proactive in their trading behavior than are institutions with low monitoring ability (banks, insurance companies, and unclassified institutions such as endowments, foundations, and self-managed pension funds). We find that percentage changes in institutional ownership are correlated with public information available more than two quarters before litigation.
机译:我们研究机构投资者是否能够避免未来的诉讼。我们的结果表明,机构可以在诉讼开始之前就通过减少或消除其在被起诉公司中的职位来提供信托作用。我们还发现,具有较高监控能力的机构群体(独立的投资顾问和共同基金)比具有较低监控能力的机构(银行,保险公司和未分类机构,例如捐赠,基金会和自营机构)在交易行为上更为主动。管理的养老金)。我们发现,诉讼前两个多季度,机构所有权的百分比变化与可获得的公共信息相关。

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