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An International Environmental Agreement for space debris mitigation among asymmetric nations

机译：《国际环境协定》，旨在减少不对称国家之间的空间碎片

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摘要

We investigate how ideas from the International Environmental Agreement (IEA) literature can be applied to the problem of space debris mitigation. Space debris pollution is similar to other international environmental problems in that there is a potential for a "tragedy of the commons" effect: individual nations bear all the cost of their mitigation measures but share only a fraction of the benefit. As a consequence, nations have a tendency to underinvest in mitigation. Coalitions of nations, brought together by IEAs, have the potential to lessen the tragedy of the commons effect by pooling the costs and benefits of mitigation. This work brings together two recent modeling advances: (ⅰ) a game theoretic model for studying the potential gains from IEA cooperation between nations with asymmetric costs and benefits, (ⅱ) an orbital debris model that gives the societal cost that specific actions, such as failing to deorbit an inactive spacecraft, have on the environment. We combine these two models with empirical launch-share data for a "proof of concept" of an IEA for a single mitigation measure-deorbiting spacecraft at the end of operational lifetime. Simulations of empirically derived and theoretical launch distributions among nations suggest the possibility that voluntary coalitions can provide significant deorbiting gains relative to nations acting in the absence of an IEA agreement.
机译：我们研究了如何将《国际环境协定》（IEA）文献中的思想应用于减轻空间碎片的问题。空间碎片污染与其他国际环境问题相似，因为有可能产生“公地悲剧”效应：单个国家承担其缓解措施的全部成本，但仅分享其收益的一小部分。结果，国家倾向于在缓解方面投资不足。由IEA组成的国家联盟有可能通过集中缓解措施的成本和收益来减轻公地效应的悲剧。这项工作汇集了两个最近的建模进展：（ⅰ）一个博弈论模型，用于研究成本和收益不对称的国家之间国际能源署合作的潜在收益；（ⅱ）轨道碎片模型，其给出了特定行动（例如未能使不活动的航天器脱离轨道，对环境造成威胁。我们将这两种模型与经验性的发射份额数据结合起来，以在运行寿命结束时为单个缓解措施的定轨航天器提供IEA的“概念证明”。国家间凭经验得出和理论上的发射分布进行的模拟表明，与没有签订IEA协议的国家相比，自愿联盟可能会带来明显的脱轨收益。

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  • 来源
    《Acta astronautica》 |2011年第2期|p.326-337|共12页
  • 作者

    Michael J. Singer; John T. Musacchio;

  • 作者单位

    Technology and Information Management Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1156 High Street, SOE 3, Santa Cruz, CA 95064-1077, United States;

    rnTechnology and Information Management Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1156 High Street, SOE 3, Santa Cruz, CA 95064-1077, United States;

  • 收录信息 美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);美国《工程索引》(EI);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    space debris; mitigation; deorbiting; international environmental agreement; (IEA); economics;

    机译：空间碎片;减轻;脱轨国际环境协定;（IEA）;经济学;

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