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Evaluating the Credibility of the European Bank Bail-In Commitment

机译：评估欧洲银行纾困承诺的信誉

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摘要

When Jonathan Hill, the former European Union (EU) Commissioner for Financial Services, introduced the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) to the people of Europe, he made an eminent promise: "From now on, it will be the banks' shareholders and their creditors who will bear the related costs and losses of a failure rather than the taxpayer" (European Commission, A single rulebook for the resolution of failing banks will apply in the EU as of 1 January 2015, 2014). In order to keep that promise, the BRRD suggested that debt corresponding to at least 8% of total liabilities should be written off before a failing bank should be recapitalized with public money. This promise entailed a delicate balancing act of maintaining financial stability whilst avoiding unduly subsidising systemically important banks (SIBs). This balance rested on investors expecting the bail-in and the market reflecting the risk of default in the yield of senior SIB bonds. If they did not, an unanticipated bail-in during a financial crisis could spark an overreactive price correction on bond yields culminating in a liquidity freeze and collapse of the interbank market. Thus, any doubts about the European Central Bank's (ECB) commitment to carry through on the bail-in could have become a self-enforcing, self-fulfilling prophecy, where even regulators with every intention of delivering cannot risk the implications of surprising markets.
机译：前欧盟金融服务专员乔纳森·希尔（Jonathan Hill）向欧洲人民介绍《银行恢复与解决方案指令》（BRRD）时，他做出了重要承诺：“从现在开始，这将是银行的股东及其债权人将承担破产的相关费用和损失，而不是由纳税人承担”（欧洲委员会，自2015年1月1日起，适用于破产银行的单一规则手册将于2014年1月1日在欧盟生效）。为了兑现这一诺言，BRRD建议，在对倒闭的银行进行公共资金注资之前，应冲销至少相当于总债务8％的债务。这一承诺需要采取微妙的平衡措施，既要保持金融稳定，又要避免对系统重要的银行（SIB）给予不当的补贴。这种平衡取决于投资者预期的保释金和市场反映了高级SIB债券收益率违约的风险。如果他们没有这样做，那么在金融危机期间出乎意料的纾困可能会引发债券收益率的过度反应性价格修正，最终导致流动性冻结和银行间市场崩溃。因此，对欧洲中央银行（ECB）进行保释的承诺的任何怀疑都可能成为一种自我执行，自我实现的预言，即使是有意提供援助的监管机构也不能冒险承受令人惊讶的市场的影响。

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  • 来源
    《Atlantic economic journal》 |2018年第4期|471-472|共2页
  • 作者

    Paul C. Noller;

  • 作者单位

    Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK;

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