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首页> 外文期刊>Atlantic economic journal >Swing States, the Winner-Take-all Electoral College, and Fiscal Federalism
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Swing States, the Winner-Take-all Electoral College, and Fiscal Federalism

机译：摇摆的国家，胜利者通吃选举团和财政联邦制

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摘要

The impact of the Electoral College on U.S. presidential elections is often criticized by academics and political commentators. One facet of its impact, the winner-take-all allocation of states' Electoral College votes, serves in practice to overweight some votes in some states relative to other votes in other states. These disparities in the relative impact of votes in a presidential election can be large. Here, a metric is introduced to quantify the magnitude of these disparities in each presidential election. Using that metric, we show that states whose votes were overweighted in a presidential election subsequently received higher levels of federal grant spending under the newly-elected (re-elected) administration.
机译：选举学院对美国总统选举的影响经常被学者和政治评论员批评。其影响的一个方面是各州选举学院票的赢家通吃分配，实际上使某些州的某些选票相对于其他州的其他选票而言是高估的。总统选举中选票相对影响的这些差异可能很大。在这里，引入了一种度量标准来量化每次总统选举中这些差距的程度。使用该指标，我们显示在总统选举中票数被加重的州随后在新当选（连任）的政府下获得了更高水平的联邦拨款支出。

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