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The Joint Effects of Partner Rotation and PCAOB Inspections on Audit Effort

机译：合作伙伴旋转和PCAOB检查对审计工作的联合影响

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摘要

This study experimentally tests the joint effects of mandatory partner rotation and PCAOB inspections on audit effort. Using a sample comprised primarily of audit partners, I find that experienced auditors plan lower effort prior to mandatory partner rotation and higher effort when PCAOB inspection risk is high relative to low. Thus, the net effect of anticipating mandatory partner rotation and high PCAOB inspection risk is no change in effort. Partners also reallocate effort away from planning and testing activities prior to rotation, consistent with a disincentive to invest in outgoing clients, while both partner rotation and high PCAOB inspection risk cause partners to spend more effort on documentation. Supplemental evidence about the spillover effects of mandatory partner rotation and PCAOB inspection risk on non-targeted clients is inconsistent with shirking behavior. Results are of interest to legislators, regulators, and auditors during the ongoing debate about the effects of current regulations.
机译：本研究通过实验测试强制伙伴旋转和PCAOB检查对审计工作的联合影响。使用主要由审计合作伙伴组成的样本，我发现经验丰富的审计师在强制性伙伴旋转之前努力，当PCAOB检验风险相对于低电平高时，较高的努力。因此，预期强制伙伴旋转和高PCAOB检验风险的净效果并没有变化。合作伙伴还重新分配努力在旋转之前的规划和测试活动，与投资外向客户的抑制作用，虽然合作伙伴旋转和高PCAOB检验风险导致合作伙伴在文件上花费更多努力。关于强制伙伴轮换溢出效应的补充证据和非目标客户对非目标客户的溢出效应是不一致的脱毛行为。在正在进行的关于现行法规效果的争论期间，立法者，监管机构和审计师的结果是感兴趣的。

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