首页> 外文期刊>Auditing >Does Incentive-Based Compensation for Chief Internal Auditors Impact Objectivity? An External Audit Risk Perspective
【24h】

Does Incentive-Based Compensation for Chief Internal Auditors Impact Objectivity? An External Audit Risk Perspective

机译:首席内部审计师基于激励的薪酬是否会影响客观性?外部审计风险观点

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

This paper considers the potential impact of internal audit incentive-based compensation (IBC) linked to company performance on the external auditor's assessment of internal audit objectivity. We posit that external auditors will view IBC as a potential threat to internal audit objectivity, thus reducing the extent of reliance on the work of internal auditors and increasing the assessment of control risk. The increase in risk and external auditor effort should result in higher audit fees. We hypothesize that the form of incentive-based compensation, namely stock-based versus cash bonuses, moderates the association between IBC and external audit fee. Finally, we consider whether underlying financial reporting risk mitigates the external auditor's potential sensitivity to IBC. We find a positive association between external audit fees and internal audit compensation based upon company performance. The association is acute to IBC paid in stock or stock options as opposed to cash bonuses. We also find evidence consistent with the IBC associations being mitigated by the company's financial reporting risks.
机译:本文考虑了与公司绩效挂钩的内部审计基于激励的报酬(IBC)对外部审计师对内部审计客观性评估的潜在影响。我们假设外部审计师将IBC视为对内部审计客观性的潜在威胁,从而减少了对内部审计师工作的依赖程度,并增加了对控制风险的评估。风险的增加和外部审计师的努力应导致更高的审计费用。我们假设基于激励的薪酬形式,即基于股票的奖励与现金奖励的关系,减轻了IBC与外部审计费用之间的联系。最后,我们考虑潜在的财务报告风险是否会减轻外部审计师对IBC的潜在敏感性。根据公司绩效,我们发现外部审计费用与内部审计报酬之间存在正相关关系。该协会对以现金或股票期权支付的IBC而不是现金红利很敏锐。我们还发现与公司的财务报告风险所缓解的IBC协会相符的证据。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号