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Can Auditors Mitigate Information Asymmetry in M&As? An Empirical Analysis of the Method of Payment in Belgian Transactions

机译：审计师可以减轻并购中的信息不对称性吗？比利时交易中付款方式的实证分析

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摘要

In this paper, we empirically examine the relationship between the external financial statement audit and the method of payment across a sample of Belgian mergers and acquisitions between listed and private firms over the period 1997-2009. We investigate whether a Big N audit (at the target level) reduces the need for a contingent payment resulting from information asymmetry about the target's value. In addition, we analyze whether a Big N audit (at the bidder level) limits incentives for bidders to exploit private information about their own value. Using multivariate ordered probit and binary regression models, we determine that contingent payments are less common when the target is audited by a Big N auditor after controlling for several other deal and firm characteristics. Furthermore, we find that the incentive to use stock payments in periods of stock market overvaluation is lower for acquirers with a Big N auditor. Finally, target shareholders are more likely to accept a contingent offer if the acquirer's financial statements are certified by a Big N auditor.
机译：在本文中，我们以样本方式考察了1997-2009年间比利时上市公司与私人公司之间的并购中的外部财务报表审计与付款方式之间的关系。我们调查了（目标级别）大笔N审计是否减少了由于有关目标价值的信息不对称而产生的或有付款的需求。此外，我们分析了Big N审核（在投标人级别）是否限制了投标人利用有关其自身价值的私人信息的动机。通过使用多元有序概率模型和二元回归模型，我们确定了在控制了其他几笔交易和公司特征之后，由Big N审计师对目标进行审计时，或有付款并不常见。此外，我们发现，对于拥有N大审计师的收购者，在股票市场高估时期使用股票付款的动机较低。最后，如果收购方的财务报表由Big N审计师认证，则目标股东更有可能接受或有要约。

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