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首页> 外文期刊>IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control >Stealthy Adversaries Against Uncertain Cyber-Physical Systems: Threat of Robust Zero-Dynamics Attack
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Stealthy Adversaries Against Uncertain Cyber-Physical Systems: Threat of Robust Zero-Dynamics Attack

机译：针对不确定的网络物理系统的隐身对手：强大的零动力学攻击威胁

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摘要

In this paper, we address the problem of constructing a robust stealthy attack that compromises uncertain cyber-physical systems having unstable zeros. We first interpret the (non-robust) conventional zero-dynamics attack based on Byrnes-Isidori normal form, and then present a new robust zero-dynamics attack for uncertain plants. Different from the conventional strategy, our key idea is to isolate the real zero-dynamics from the plants input-output relation and to replace it with an auxiliary nominal zero-dynamics. As a result, this alternative attack does not require the exact model knowledge anymore. The price to pay for the robustness is to utilize the input and output signals of the system (i.e., disclosure resources). It is shown that a disturbance observer can be employed to realize the new attack philosophy when there is a lack of model knowledge. Simulation results with a hydro-turbine power system are presented to verify the attack performance and robustness.
机译：在本文中，我们解决了构建强大的隐形攻击问题，该攻击妥协了具有不稳定零的不确定网络物理系统。我们首先根据Byrnes-Isidori正常形式解释（非强大）常规零动力攻击，然后为不确定植物呈现新的强大零动力学攻击。与传统策略不同，我们的关键思想是将真正的零动态与植物输入输出关系隔离，并用辅助标称零动态替换它。结果，这种替代攻击不再需要确切的模型知识。支付稳健性的价格是利用系统的输入和输出信号（即，披露资源）。结果表明，当缺乏模型知识时，可以采用干扰观察者实现新的攻击哲学。提出了利用水轮机电力系统的仿真结果来验证攻击性能和鲁棒性。

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