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The Problem of Reference to Nonexistents in Cocchiarella’s Conceptual Realism

机译:奇奇亚雷拉概念现实主义中不存在提及的问题

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摘要

This article is a critical review of Cocchiarella’s theory of reference. In conceptual realism, there are two central distinctions regarding reference: first, between active and deactivated use of referential expressions, and, second, between using referential expressions with and without existential presupposition. Cocchiarella’s normative restrictions on the existential presuppositions of reference lead to postulating two fundamentally different kinds of objects in conceptual realism: realia or concrete objects, on the one hand, and abstract intensional objects or nonexistents, on the other. According to Cocchiarella, nonexistents can be referred to only without existential presuppositions. However, referring to nonexistents with existential presuppositions is an ordinary human practice. To account for this fact, Cocchiarella’s normative theory of reference should be supplemented by a descriptive account of referring.
机译:本文是对Cocchiarella参考理论的批判性评论。在概念上的现实主义中,关于引用有两个主要的区别:第一,在主动使用和取消使用引用表示之间,第二,在使用带有和不存在预设的引用表示之间。 Cocchiarella对引用的存在性预设的规范限制导致在概念现实主义中假设两种根本不同的对象:一方面是Realia或具体对象,另一方面是抽象内涵对象或不存在的对象。根据Cocchiarella的说法,不存在的人只能在没有存在性前提的情况下被提及。但是,用存在的前提来指称不存在是一种普通的人类实践。为了解释这个事实,应以描述性的引用方式补充Cocchiarella的规范引用理论。

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