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首页> 外文期刊>Baltic Journal of Management >The impact of ownership concentration, and identity on company performance in the US and in Central and Eastern Europe
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The impact of ownership concentration, and identity on company performance in the US and in Central and Eastern Europe

机译：所有权集中度和身份对美国以及中欧和东欧公司业绩的影响

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to assess the relationship between ownership structure and company performance of public companies. The central tenet of the analysis is that separation of ownership and control has an adverse effect on the value of the firm, as information asymmetry between owners and managers is exploited by management. Design/methodology/approach – A cross sectional regression is conducted using data on 669 companies, which were members of the S&P 500, BUX (Hungary), WIG (Poland), SBI (Slovenia), PX (Czech) indexes in the third quarter of 2005. Owners with at least 5 percent share ownership are collected from Reuters and Business and Company Resource Center databases. Findings – Results for CEE companies are in line with that of Earle et al. and also support Zwiebel's “space creation” concept. The negative effect of multiple shareholdings is due to collective action problems instead of alternative explanations such as manager repression. Companies in the CEE region have rather concentrated ownership, which implies that at least there is one blockholder with dominant stake allowing him to influence corporate decision making. The contribution to management control of the next largest blockholder generates tension between the two causing costs that exceed the benefits of control. Interestingly, enough in case of institutional investors as largest blockholders the formerly positive effect on performance became negative. This is in contradiction with the popular literature that emphasizes the beneficent role of institutional investors. Results for the US firms also show that dominant blockholders “create their own space” in another word when the ownership stake of the largest blockholder exceeds 10 percent the contribution of smaller owners to the monitoring and control of management is negative. This implies that even though the dominant blockholder is much smaller in size relative to the one in the CEE sample its willingness to cooperate is low. On the other hand, when the largest blockholder is not dominant the coalition of blockholders is able to create value by efficient monitoring. Institutional investor as dominant blockholder further enhances the efficiency of control, while decreases it when coalition consists solely from institutional investors. Originality/value – The definition of ownership concentration outlined by Zwiebel is applied. To assess the effect of coalition of blockholders on company performance the concept determined by Earle et al. is used. Their notion is extended by differentiating between blockholder identity and the homogeneity of blockholder coalition, in order to scrutinize the consequence of shareholder activism.
机译：目的–本文的目的是评估所有权结构与上市公司的公司绩效之间的关系。该分析的中心思想是所有权和控制权的分离会对公司的价值产生不利影响，因为所有者和管理者之间的信息不对称被管理层利用。设计/方法/方法–使用第三季度S＆P 500，匈牙利BUX（匈牙利），WIG（波兰），SBI（斯洛文尼亚），PX（捷克）指数的669家公司的数据进行横截面回归是2005年的数据。拥有至少5％股份的所有者是从路透社以及商业和公司资源中心数据库中收集的。调查结果– CEE公司的结果与Earle等人的结果一致。并且也支持Zwiebel的“空间创造”概念。多种股权的负面影响是由于集体行动问题，而不是诸如经理人压制之类的其他解释。中东欧地区的公司拥有相当集中的所有权，这意味着至少有一个大股东拥有主要股份，从而可以影响公司的决策。对下一个最大的大股东的管理控制的贡献在两者之间产生了紧张关系，导致成本超过了控制的利益。有趣的是，对于机构投资者最大的大股东而言，以前对业绩的正面影响就变成了负面。这与强调机构投资者的慈善作用的通俗文献相矛盾。美国公司的结果还表明，当最大的大股东的所有权超过10％时，占主导地位的大股东会“创造自己的空间”，而小股东对管理层的监控的贡献是负的。这意味着，即使与CEE样本中的大股东相比，大股东的规模要小得多，但合作的意愿仍然很低。另一方面，当最大的大股东不占主导地位时，大股东的联盟就可以通过有效的监控来创造价值。机构投资者作为主要的大股东可以进一步提高控制效率，而当联盟完全由机构投资者组成时，控制效率会降低。原创性/价值–采用Zwiebel概述的所有权集中度定义。为了评估大股东联盟对公司绩效的影响，Earle等人确定了这一概念。用来。通过区分大股东身份和大股东联盟的同质性来扩展他们的概念，以便审查股东积极主义的后果。

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