首页> 外文期刊>Cambridge Review of International Affairs >Domestic politics and climate change: international public goods in two-level games
【24h】

Domestic politics and climate change: international public goods in two-level games

机译:国内政治与气候变化:两级博弈中的国际公益

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

We use the theory of two-level games to explore how domestic constraints affect the outcome of bargaining games over national contributions to an international public good such as global climate change, and to discuss the implications for the Schelling conjecture. We model the international negotiations on two dimensions—domestic and foreign contributions to the international public good—and extend the basic two-level model by examining a nonzero sum, two-dimensional conflict model on level one that includes characteristics of both conflict and cooperation. Our main results suggest that if the domestic game is a ratification game (as in the presidential system of the US), then contributions do not exceed those in a benchmark game without domestic constraints. But if the domestic game is an election game (which is more important in the parliamentary system of most continental-European countries), contributions can actually be higher than the benchmark.
机译:我们使用两层博弈论来探讨国内约束条件如何影响讨价还价博弈对国家对国际公共物品(例如全球气候变化)的贡献的讨价还价结果,并讨论对谢林猜想的影响。我们在两个维度上对国际谈判进行建模,即对国际公共利益的国内和国外贡献,并通过研究一级上的非零和,二维冲突模型(包括冲突和合作的特征)来扩展基本的两级模型。我们的主要结果表明,如果国内博弈是批准博弈(如美国的总统制),则贡献不超过没有国内约束的基准博弈。但是,如果国内博弈是选举博弈(在大多数欧洲大陆国家的议会体系中更重要),则贡献实际上可能高于基准。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号