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首页> 外文期刊>Comparative Strategy >Armed Forces, States, and Threats: Institutions and the British and French Responses to the 1991 Gulf War
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Armed Forces, States, and Threats: Institutions and the British and French Responses to the 1991 Gulf War

机译：武装部队，国家和威胁：机构与1991年海湾战争的英法联军

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Reacting to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait, two European states, the United Kingdom and France, contributed large forces and participated in land, air, and sea operations. The contributions of these states varied considerably in their composition and role. The United Kingdom deployed as many forces (45,000 personnel) as the country could manage, while France sent a significant force (15,000) that fell short of its potential. Once in Arabia, the British played a major role in coalition planning, while the French remained operationally aloof. Finally, when it came to launch offensive operations, British forces were central to the coalition's riskiest endeavors, such as special forces raids and preparing a fake amphibious invasion, while French forces played a credible, but less dangerous role. This article tests the ability of realism and historic institutionalism to explain these different responses to the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis. Although realism appears a priori to possess a high degree of explanatory power, a detailed process tracing analysis reveals that historical institutionalism can better account for the different outcomes observed.View full textDownload full textRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2012.647524
机译：为了应对伊拉克对科威特的入侵和吞并，两个欧洲国家，即英国和法国派出了大批部队，并参与了陆，空和海上行动。这些国家的贡献在组成和作用上有很大不同。联合王国部署了尽可能多的部队（45,000人），而法国则派出了一支庞大的部队（15,000人），其潜力未达标。到达阿拉伯后，英国人在联盟计划中发挥了重要作用，而法国人则在行动上保持超然状态。最终，在发起进攻行动时，英军在联盟最冒险的努力中处于中心地位，例如特种部队的突袭和准备假造的两栖入侵，而法国部队则发挥了可信但不那么危险的作用。本文测试了现实主义和历史制度主义解释这些对1990-91年海湾危机的不同反应的能力。尽管现实主义似乎具有较高的解释力，但详细的过程跟踪分析显示，历史制度主义可以更好地说明观察到的不同结果。查看全文下载全文相关的var addthis_config = {ui_cobrand：“泰勒和弗朗西斯在线” services_compact：“ citeulike，netvibes，twitter，technorati，美味，linkedin，facebook，stumbleupon，digg，google，更多”，发布：“ ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b”};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2012.647524

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