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On the difficulty of achieving anonymity for Vehicle-2-X communication

机译：关于Vehicle-2-X通信实现匿名的困难

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Vehicle-2-X communications are hailed as the future to improve safety on the roads. Ensuring that messages sent by vehicles contain correct information is crucial to fulfill this objective, as misleading information could disrupt traffic and create potentially dangerous situations. Thus, Vehicle-2-X communication requires authentication to ensure that messages come from legitimate vehicles, and to identify vehicles that send misleading information. If a unique public key certificate per vehicle is used to authenticate messages, then the identification of misbehaving (or malfunctioning) vehicles is straightforward, and so is the revocation of their credentials. This solution however, offers no privacy protection to drivers, as the tracking of all the vehicles' movements is equally trivial. A privacy-preserving alternative is to authenticate messages using (unlinkable) one-time pseudonyms, but these protocols are computationally expensive and their certificate revocation process is more complex. Intermediate solutions that trade off privacy and efficiency are based on multiple certificates per vehicle, which may or may not be unique, that are reused to authenticate messages. In this work we analyze two such intermediate solutions that have been proposed by IntelliDrive, US Department of Transportation (DoT). We show that by exploiting the reuse of pseudonyms and spatio-temporal constraints the service provider is capable of tracking a large percentage of vehicles. Furthermore, we find that one of the schemes fails to provide privacy even if the adversary does not control the service provider and only listens to the communications of vehicles.
机译：车辆2-X通信被誉为改善道路安全性的未来。确保车辆发送的消息包含正确的信息对于实现此目标至关重要，因为误导性信息可能会干扰交通并造成潜在的危险情况。因此，Vehicle-2-X通信需要进行身份验证，以确保消息来自合法车辆，并标识发送误导性信息的车辆。如果使用每辆车的唯一公共密钥证书来验证消息，则识别行为异常（或发生故障）的车辆非常简单，其凭证的撤销也很简单。但是，此解决方案无法为驾驶员提供隐私保护，因为对所有车辆的运动进行跟踪同样是微不足道的。保留隐私的替代方法是使用（不可链接的）一次性假名对消息进行身份验证，但是这些协议在计算上很昂贵，并且其证书吊销过程更加复杂。权衡隐私和效率的中间解决方案基于每辆车的多个证书，这些证书可能是唯一的，也可能不是唯一的，可重复用于验证消息。在这项工作中，我们分析了美国运输部（DoT）IntelliDrive提出的两种此类中间解决方案。我们表明，通过利用假名的重用和时空约束，服务提供商可以跟踪很大比例的车辆。此外，我们发现，即使对手不控制服务提供商而仅收听车辆的通信，该方案之一也无法提供隐私。

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