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Career incentive contract design in project management under companies' competition and asymmetric information

机译:企业竞争和信息不对称下项目管理中的职业激励合同设计

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摘要

Designing attractive contracts for project managers, for example, career incentive contracts, is one of the most pressing demands for companies. This paper studies an agency problem with two companies (a focal company and a competing company) competing over a menu of career incentive contracts for a manager. The manager has private information about the project’s profitability and unobservable effort. From the focal company’s perspective, we confirm that it is unnecessary to provide career incentives under full information regardless of whether competition exists. Our study also demonstrates that providing career incentives is always beneficial for the focal company under dual asymmetric information in the context of monopoly. In contrast, when encountering another competing company, as counterintuitive as it may sound, the focal company is better off not providing career incentive contracts in some circumstances. We further identify the conditions under which competition has no effect on the focal company’s profit. Finally, our study provides recommendations on mitigating the adverse impacts caused by competition and asymmetric information through simulation results.
机译:为项目经理设计有吸引力的合同,例如职业激励合同,是公司最紧迫的要求之一。本文研究了两家公司(一家重点公司和一家竞争公司)的代理人问题,他们竞争经理的职业激励合同菜单。经理拥有有关该项目的获利能力和不可观察的努力的私人信息。从焦点公司的角度来看,我们确认无论竞争是否存在,都没有必要在充分的信息下提供职业激励。我们的研究还表明,在双重垄断的情况下,在双重不对称信息下,提供职业激励总是对焦点公司有利。相反,当遇到另一家竞争公司时,听起来可能有点违反直觉,那么重点公司最好不在某些情况下提供职业激励合同。我们进一步确定在什么条件下竞争不会影响焦点公司的利润。最后,我们的研究为通过模拟结果缓解竞争和信息不对称造成的不利影响提供了建议。

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