...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Computers & Industrial Engineering >The equilibrium contract rent and reward money under incomplete information in reverse supply chains: A game theoretical approach and computational study
【24h】

The equilibrium contract rent and reward money under incomplete information in reverse supply chains: A game theoretical approach and computational study

机译：逆向供应链中不完全信息下的均衡合同租金与奖励金：博弈论与计算研究

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Many electronic end-of-life (EOL) products are becoming obsolete sooner due to advances in technology. Hence, manufacturers hire third-party recyclers as subcontractors to recycle brand-name products. A complicated profile of recycling EOL products adds a significant cost burden to the third-party recyclers, while only the manufacturer has a superior understanding of the profile of recycling EOL products (homogeneity degree of EOL products). This paper describes the decision of the manufacturer and the third-party recycler in reverse supply chains under incomplete information of product homogeneity, which affects the unit profit of recycled products. The supply chain model assumes that customers receive reward money for returning obsolete products, and that the manufacturer as a leader and the third-party recycler as a follower determine the contract rent offered to the third-party recycler and the reward money paid to customers, respectively. Both the manufacturer and third-party recycler want to maximize their profit functions. We propose a game theoretical approach to search for the equilibrium contract rent for the third-party recycler and the equilibrium reward money for customers returning products for recycling. We conclude with a discussion of the impact of the contract rent and reward money on the equilibrium solution.
机译：由于技术的进步，许多电子寿命终止（EOL）产品已经过时。因此，制造商雇用第三方回收商作为分包商来回收名牌产品。复杂的回收EOL产品概况给第三方回收商增加了巨大的成本负担，而只有制造商才对回收EOL产品的概况（EOL产品的同质度）有更好的了解。本文描述了在产品同质性不完整的情况下，制造商和第三方回收商在逆向供应链中的决策，这会影响回收产品的单位利润。供应链模型假设客户获得退回过时产品的奖励金，并且制造商作为领导者而第三方回收商作为追随者确定提供给第三方回收商的合同租金以及支付给客户的奖励金，分别。制造商和第三方回收商都希望最大化其利润功能。我们提出了一种博弈论的方法来寻找第三方回收商的均衡合同租金，并为退还产品进行回收的客户提供均衡的报酬。最后，我们讨论了合同租金和奖励金对均衡解决方案的影响。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号