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首页> 外文期刊>Constitutional Political Economy >Do departures from democratic accountability compromise the stability of public finances? Keynesianism, central banking, and minority governments in the Canadian system of party government, 1867–2009
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Do departures from democratic accountability compromise the stability of public finances? Keynesianism, central banking, and minority governments in the Canadian system of party government, 1867–2009

机译：脱离民主问责制是否会损害公共财政的稳定性？凯恩斯主义，中央银行和加拿大政党政府体系中的少数派政府，1867–2009年

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摘要

This paper is concerned with the effectiveness of Westminster parliamentary institutions in ensuring the stability of a nation’s public finances. Our starting point and major hypothesis is that the governance structure embodied in Canada’s parliamentary system has contributed importantly to the maintenance of fiscal stability. The fact that the Government of Canada, like the central government of many other modern democracies, has survived for over a century without default on its public debt means that in some meaningful sense, long run responsibility with respect to the nation’s finances has in fact been achieved, and we show that this is in fact the case. Hence a more meaningful test of our main hypothesis requires the designation of specific sub-periods when the ideological background for political policy making changed and/or when the institutions and organizations for operationalizing policy varied in ways that either improved or discouraged responsible fiscal performance. We consider ideational and institutional factors that are predicted to either enhance or detract from accountability and fiscal stability, including central banking, the adoption of Keynesianism, inflation targeting and periods of minority government, and test for their effects on long run stability of the debt to GDP ratio using data for almost the entire history of the modern state from 1867 to 2008.
机译：本文关注的是威斯敏斯特议会机构在确保国家公共财政稳定方面的有效性。我们的出发点和主要假设是，加拿大议会体系中体现的治理结构为维护财政稳定做出了重要贡献。加拿大政府与许多其他现代民主国家的中央政府一样，已经存活了一个多世纪，没有拖欠其公共债务，这意味着在某种意义上，对国家财政的长期责任实际上是实现，并且我们证明事实确实如此。因此，当政治决策的意识形态背景发生变化和/或政策实施的机构和组织以改善或阻止负责任的财政绩效的方式发生变化时，对我们的主要假设进行更有意义的检验需要指定特定的子时期。我们考虑了预期会增强或损害问责制和财政稳定性的概念和制度因素，包括中央银行，采用凯恩斯主义，通货膨胀目标制和少数派政府时期，并测试它们对债务长期稳定性的影响。 GDP比率使用的数据几乎涵盖了1867年至2008年整个现代国家的整个历史。

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