When Grenfell Tower burned, killing 72 people and ruining the lives of hundreds more, it marked a tragic end to decades of falling fatalities in house fires in England. That steady decline in fire deaths was highlighted in the briefing I was given as a new minister in 2010, overseeing the development of Building Regulations in what was then the Department for Communities and Local Government. Taken with the parallel improvement in construction site safety and the 'Safe Home' mantra, it seemed exemplary. During my two years as a minister working on raising standards and compliance for the energy performance of buildings, I often found myself saying that I wanted to see the industry's commitment to delivering good energy performance as strong as its commitment to fire safety. Now the Grenfell inquiry and the Hackitt Review have blown away all illusions that the improving fire-safety record could be taken as a testament to the construction industry's diligence in implementing fire-safety rules. What has been displayed in public evidence to the inquiry is a catalogue of failure at every point in the commissioning, designing, testing, specifying, regulating, construction and management of Grenfell Tower.
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