In this paper I explore Gorampa's conception of the objects of negation. My primary aim is to show that, in Gorampa's conception of the objects of negation, negating the extreme existent (bhva/yod pa)—the first of the tetralemma (catu ko i/mtha' bzhi)—entails negating the conventional realities qua truths themselves. The paper first identifies Gorampa's notions of the objects of negation soteriogically and epistemically, and second it considers Gorampa's arguments defending his treatment of truths (bden pa) as the objects of negation. The chief arguments Gorampa employs for negating the truths (by way of eliminating the extreme of existence) can be summarised as follows: that all things are conceptually reified elaborations (spros pa), the Prsa gika is committed to the transcendent of all spros pa; that all entities are false as they all fail to reveal their reality when they are subjected to logical analysis; that an enlightened consciousness does not verify the existence of truths; that there is no commonly agreed appearance that can be taken as a common basis for the debate between the Buddhist reificationist and the Prsa gika Mdhyamikas; that truths are the catalysts for driving ignorance through conceptual graspings to truths; that grasping to truths obstructs a seeker from attaining the enlightenment; and finally that seeing things as dependently arisen amounts to seeing nothing at all.
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机译：在本文中，我探讨了戈兰帕关于否定对象的概念。我的主要目的是表明，在Gorampa的否定对象概念中，否定极端存在（bhva / yod pa），即四难解中的第一个（catu ko i / mtha'bzhi），它会否定传统现实和真理。他们自己。该论文首先从语言学和认识论上确定了戈兰帕关于否定对象的概念，其次，它认为戈兰帕捍卫他对真理的处理的论点（bden pa）是否定的对象。 Gorampa用来否定真相的主要论点（通过消除存在的极端性）可以概括如下：一切都是概念化的细化（spros pa），Prsa gika致力于所有spros pa的超越。所有实体都是错误的，因为它们在进行逻辑分析时都无法揭示其真实性；开明的意识并不能证明真理的存在；佛教复兴主义者和普尔萨·吉卡·姆达米阿米卡斯之间没有公认的外表可作为辩论的共同基础；事实是通过对概念的概念性了解来推动无知的催化剂；掌握真相会妨碍寻求者获得启蒙；最后，视事物为从属事物就等于什么也看不到。
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