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Conditional commitments: Why states use caveats to reserve their efforts in military coalition operations

机译：有条件的承诺：各州为何要使用警告来保留其在军事联合行动中的努力

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摘要

Why do states make substantial military contributions to coalition operations, while at the same time apply reservations, or caveats, to how the coalition can use the military contributions? Caveats rose to prominence in defense and policy circles with NATO’s campaign in Afghanistan. In the scholarly security literature, the term remains a buzzword for all types of reserved efforts by states in coalition warfare, but there are few theoretical accounts addressing caveats. This article contributes to the knowledge gap on caveats through a comparative case study of Denmark’s, the Netherlands’, and Norway’s contributions to NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011. It demonstrates that caveats can occur through three different causal pathways: compromises from domestic bargaining, handling of alliance commitments, and implementation and civil-military relations. Insights into the complexity that causes caveats are highly relevant for both political and military decision-makers that are trying to coordinate states’ effort in coalition operations.
机译：为什么各州对联军行动作出大量军事贡献，而同时又对联军如何使用军事贡献采取保留或警告呢？北约在阿富汗的竞选活动引起了国防和政策界的注意。在学术安全性文献中，该术语仍然是各国在联合战争中所做出的各种保留努力的流行语，但很少有理论上的注意事项。本文通过对丹麦，荷兰和挪威对北约2011年对利比亚干预的贡献进行比较的案例研究，弥补了警告方面的知识空白。它表明警告可以通过三种不同的因果途径发生：国内谈判，妥协的妥协联盟承诺，执行与军民关系。对于引起警告的复杂性的见解与试图协调各州在联合行动中的努力的政治和军事决策者都息息相关。

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