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Corporate governance in the shipping industry: board interlocks and agency conflicts

机译：航运业的公司治理：董事会联动和代理冲突

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摘要

Purpose - This paper aims to explore the effect of interlocking directorates on agency conflicts and corporate performance in the shipping industry. Design/methodology/approach - The authors use social network analysis to discover central nodes in the network of personal and corporate connections in an international sample of 110 listed shipping companies. Findings - Assessing network structure, the authors find that the network of corporate leaders is denser than the network of shipping companies. The network of shipping companies is populated with many isolated nodes; the network of shipping executives and directors is populated with many cohesive groups in which the longest distance between two corporate leaders is two companies. The authors find that interlocking corporate leadership can help resolve agency conflicts in the shipping industry, bearing a negative effect on the magnitude of agency costs. The extent of leadership overlaps is associated with board size, financial leverage and profitability. The relationship between profits and interlocks is bidirectional, implying that interlocking directorates bear a positive effect on asset returns. Originality/value - The authors map the relational structures in the social networks of companies and company leaders in the shipping industry and discover the cross-sectional determinants of interlocks in the shipping industry. The finding about the effect of interlocks on profitability and agency costs bears policy implications for the design of corporate governance in the shipping industry.
机译：目的-本文旨在探讨相互联系的董事会对航运业中代理冲突和公司绩效的影响。设计/方法/方法-作者使用社交网络分析来发现110家上市航运公司的国际样本中的个人和公司关系网络中的中心节点。结论-评估网络结构后，作者发现公司领导者网络比货运公司网络更密集。船运公司的网络中有许多孤立的节点。航运业高管和董事网络由许多凝聚力强的群体组成，其中两个公司负责人之间的最长距离是两个公司。作者发现，相互联系的企业领导可以帮助解决航运业中的代理冲突，对代理成本的大小产生负面影响。领导层重叠的程度与董事会规模，财务杠杆和盈利能力有关。利润与联锁之间的关系是双向的，这意味着联锁董事对资产收益具有积极影响。独创性/价值-作者绘制了航运业公司和公司领导者的社交网络中的关系结构，并发现了航运业联锁的横截面决定因素。有关联锁对利润率和代理成本的影响的发现，对航运业公司治理的设计具有政策意义。

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