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The use of nonfinancial performance measures in CEO bonus compensation

机译：在首席执行官奖金赔偿中使用非金融绩效措施

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Research Question/IssueIn this study, we explore the relationship between the use of nonfinancial performance measures in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) bonus plans and CEO power, moderated by compensation committee monitoring. Furthermore, we investigate whether the inclusion of nonfinancial performance measures is associated with higher CEO bonus pay sensitivity to shareholder returns.Research Findings/InsightsUsing a sample of FTSE 350 firms during the period 20072013, we find that CEO power is significantly negatively related to the propensity of using nonfinancial performance measures. This negative relationship, however, is moderated by higher levels of compensation committee monitoring. We also find that firms combining nonfinancial and financial performance measures in CEO bonus plans tend to have stronger CEO bonus pay sensitivity to shareholder returns than firms using financial measures alone. Thus, our results suggest that boards of directors adopting nonfinancial performance measures are able to better align CEO incentives with shareholder interests. We find similar results when using the weight of nonfinancial performance measures in the bonus plan in our analyses.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThis study empirically supports the managerial power theory whereby powerful CEOs influence the choice of performance measures in their bonus plans. However, effective compensation committees are found to attenuate the influence of powerful CEOs and to better align their interests with those of shareholders. Our result of stronger bonus pay sensitivity to shareholder returns for firms combining nonfinancial with financial performance measures implies that the informativeness of these measures enhances the firm's ability to tie CEO bonus compensation to shareholder wealth.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThis study offers insights to members of boards of directors, especially compensation committee members, who are interested in improving the design of executive incentive contracts to better align managerial incentives to shareholder interests. Furthermore, the findings inform regulators about the importance of alternative performance measures in payperformance sensitivity and may warrant increased firm disclosure of the details of the pay structure.
机译：研究问题/问题本研究，我们探讨了行政总裁（CEO）奖金计划和首席执行官的非金融绩效措施之间的关系，由赔偿委员会监测主持。此外，我们调查了纳入非金融绩效措施是否与股东回报的高等总监奖金有关。研究结果/ Insightsus在20072013年期间，富时350家公司的样本，我们发现首席执行官权力与倾向显着呈负相关利用非金融绩效措施。然而，这种负面关系受到更高水平的补偿委员会监测的主持。我们还发现，在首席执行官奖金计划中结合非金融和财务绩效措施的公司倾向于拥有更强大的首席执行官奖金对股东回报的依据，而不是仅使用财务措施的公司。因此，我们的成果表明，采用非金融绩效措施的董事会能够更好地将首席执行官激励与股东利益稳定。我们发现在我们的分析中使用奖金计划中的非金融性能措施的重量时发现了类似的结果。理论/学术态度的研究经验支持管理权力理论，强大的首席执行官在奖金计划中影响了绩效措施的选择。但是，发现有效的赔偿委员会才能验证强大的CEO的影响，并更好地与股东的利益对齐。我们强大的奖金对股东的敏感性与财务绩效措施相结合的公司申请依据意味着这些措施的信息能力提高了公司将首席执行官奖金赔偿纳入股东财富的能力.Practitioner /政策含义，研究了对董事会成员提供见解董事，特别是赔偿委员会成员，他们有兴趣改善执行奖励合同的设计，以更好地对准股东利益的管理激励。此外，调查结果通知监管机构关于薪酬表情敏感度的替代性能措施的重要性，可能需要增加薪酬结构细节的公司披露。

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