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'Real Owners' and 'Common Investors': Institutional Logics and the Media as a Governance Mechanism

机译:“真实所有者”和“共同投资者”:制度逻辑和作为治理机制的媒体

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Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: Based on an analysis of Swedish press material covering two corporate scandals, this paper reveals the institutional logic propagated by the Swedish press pertaining to large shareholders and the relationship between this institutional logic and the attribution of blame for the scandals to shareholders by the press. Research Findings/Insights: The results reveal an institutional logic with a clear notion of what constitutes a "real owner," which is reminiscent of an understanding of ownership and control prevalent in the literature before the emergence of agency theory. Real owners are associated with moderation of management, responsibility, long-termism, and legitimate influence in the firm. In response to scandals, this institutional logic leads the Swedish press to question the "realness" of an existing controlling shareholder or, if no controlling shareholder exists, to blame the problem on the absence of a real owner. Theoretical/Academic Implications: It is important to understand the institutional logic propagated by the press to see how the media functions as a governance mechanism, since a given institutional logic leads the media to "name and shame" in specific ways. The institutional logic propagated by the Swedish press differs from what previous research has indicated is prevalent in the US, suggesting that the media as a governance mechanism has different effects in different countries. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This paper illustrates the importance of understanding prevalent informal norms when predicting effects of corporate governance reform and suggests that these informal aspects are highly path dependent.
机译:稿件类型:实证研究问题/问题:基于对涉及两个公司丑闻的瑞典新闻材料的分析,本文揭示了瑞典新闻界传播的涉及大股东的制度逻辑,以及该制度逻辑与归咎于公司的责任之间的关系。新闻界对股东的丑闻。研究发现/见解:研究结果揭示了一种制度逻辑,其中明确包含什么构成“实际所有者”,这让人联想到代理理论出现之前对文学中普遍存在的所有权和控制权的理解。真正的所有者与管理的节制,责任感,长期性和对公司的合法影响有关。为了回应丑闻,这种制度逻辑导致瑞典媒体质疑现有控股股东的“现实”,或者,如果不存在控股股东,则将问题归咎于缺乏实际所有者。理论/学术含义:了解媒体传播的制度逻辑以了解媒体如何作为治理机制发挥作用非常重要,因为给定的制度逻辑会导致媒体以特定方式“命名和羞辱”。瑞典媒体传播的制度逻辑不同于先前的研究表明在美国普遍存在,这表明媒体作为一种治理机制在不同国家具有不同的影响。从业者/政策的含义:本文说明了在预测公司治理改革的效果时理解普遍的非正式规范的重要性,并建议这些非正式方面在很大程度上取决于路径。

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