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Governance Bundles, Firm Performance, and the Substitutability and Complementarity of Governance Mechanisms

机译：治理捆绑，公司绩效以及治理机制的可替代性和互补性

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Manuscript Type: ConceptualrnResearch Question/Issue: This paper extends the theory of bundles of corporate governance mechanisms to address agency issues within the Anglo-Saxon system of corporate governance. The focus of our study is to detail the role of firm performance as a key determinant of how the governance mechanisms of monitoring and incentive alignment serve as complements or substitutes in addressing agency issues. Previous research has looked at these mechanisms in isolation from each other, with limited regard for the contingencies of firm performance and external monitoring. We propose that it is best to look at these mechanisms as a bundle of mechanisms to protect shareholder interests, and that firm performance is a key determinant of the composition of this bundle.rnResearch Findings/Insights: We introduce firm performance as a critical contingency that heightens shareholders' concerns over governance issues as they seek to retain control over adverse selection and moral hazard problems. We propose that when firms are performing poorly, outside monitoring by institutional investors can complement internal monitoring by boards of directors.rnTheoretical/Academic Implications: We examine governance bundles under both agency and stewardship theoretical lenses to tie together previous empirical research and advance theory. In specifying the role of firm performance in determining the mix of mechanisms within the governance bundle, we reconcile prior disparate findings as to whether or not these governance mechanisms act in a complementary or substitutable fashion.rnPractitioner/Policy Implications: The conceptualization of these governance mechanisms has practitioner merit in analyzing the challenges that board members face managing agency conflicts through the mix of governance mechanisms, given different levels of firm performance. Our research also shows that, under conditions of poor performance, shareholders can provide effective external monitoring that can improve the overall governance effectiveness of the firm.
机译：论文类型：概念研究问题/问题：本文扩展了公司治理机制捆绑理论，以解决盎格鲁撒克逊公司治理体系中的代理问题。我们研究的重点是详细说明公司绩效的作用，这是决定监督和激励措施的治理机制如何作为解决代理问题的补充或替代的关键决定因素。先前的研究将这些机制彼此隔离地进行了研究，并很少考虑公司绩效和外部监控的偶然性。我们建议最好将这些机制看成是保护股东利益的机制，而公司绩效是决定这一系列机制的关键决定因素。研究发现/见解：我们将公司绩效作为一种关键的偶然性，股东寻求保持对逆向选择和道德风险问题的控制权时，加剧了他们对治理问题的担忧。我们建议，当公司业绩不佳时，机构投资者的外部监督可以补充董事会的内部监督。理论/学术意义：我们研究代理和管理理论视角下的治理捆绑，以将先前的经验研究和高级理论结合在一起。在指定公司绩效在确定治理捆绑内的各种机制时所起的作用时，我们调和了先前关于这些治理机制是否以互补或替代方式发挥作用的不同结论。实践者/政策含义：这些治理机制的概念化在公司绩效水平不同的情况下，具有从业者的才能来分析董事会成员通过治理机制的混合来应对管理机构冲突的挑战。我们的研究还表明，在业绩不佳的情况下，股东可以提供有效的外部监控，从而提高公司的整体治理效率。

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