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Does the Presence of Institutional Investors Influence Accruals Management? Evidence from Australia

机译：机构投资者的存在会影响应计管理吗？来自澳大利亚的证据

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Recent debates on the corporate governance role of institutional investors have centred around whether they monitor their portfolio firms (exercise voice) or vote with their feet (exit). We examine these competing views in the context of how institutions' voice vs exit role, proxied by institutional ownership levels, is associated with their portfolio firms' earnings management in multiple settings. We extend Koh (2003, The British Accounting Review, 35, 105-128) by examining the effect of both short-term and long-term oriented institutional ownership on the extent of earnings management by portfolios firms with different incentives for earnings management. Specifically, we expect that the non-linear relation between institutional ownership and earnings management found in Koh (2003) is more likely to be present for portfolio firms with stronger incentives to meet/beat earnings thresholds. Our results suggest that transient and long-term oriented institutions co-exist and have differential effects on portfolio firms' earnings management. Transient institutions are associated with upward accruals management, while long-term oriented institutions constrain such upward accruals management for portfolio firms that have strong incentives to do so (specifically, firms with non-discretionary earnings below prior year earnings). This suggests long-term oriented institutions can act as a corporate governance mechanism to mitigate aggressive earnings management. Overall, we find that the association between institutional ownership and earnings management is not systematic across all firms and is context dependent, suggesting complex associations between institutional ownership and earnings management strategies exist.
机译：最近有关机构投资者在公司治理中的作用的争论集中在他们是监视自己的投资组合公司（行使声音）还是用脚投票（退出）。我们以机构所有权水平为代表的机构的声音与退出角色如何与他们的投资组合公司在多种环境中的收益管理相关联的情况下，考察了这些相互竞争的观点。我们通过考察短期和长期导向的机构所有制对具有不同激励措施的投资组合公司的收益管理程度的影响，扩展了Koh（2003，英国会计评论，35，105-128）。具体来说，我们期望Koh（2003）中发现的机构所有权与收益管理之间的非线性关系更有可能出现在具有达到/超越收益阈值的诱因的证券投资公司中。我们的结果表明，短暂的和长期的机构并存，并且对投资组合公司的收益管理产生不同的影响。瞬息万变的机构与应计制管理相关联，而长期定向的机构对具有强烈动机的投资组合公司（特别是非全权收益低于上一年度收益的公司）限制了这种向上应计制管理。这表明，面向长期的机构可以作为公司治理机制来减轻积极的盈余管理。总体而言，我们发现机构所有权和盈余管理之间的关联并非在所有公司中都是系统性的，并且取决于具体情况，这表明机构所有权和盈余管理策略之间存在复杂的关联。

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