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Contract Design in Processing Trade

机译:加工贸易合同设计

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摘要

Processing trade may involve buyers contracting with foreign producers to process and assemble intermediate inputs into a final product. The buyer may decide to either contractually control or delegate quality provision for his products. Quality control seems the obvious choice, especially in settings where the producer's production capability is not observable. Correspondingly, the traditional framework based on information asymmetry assigns no value to quality delegation, as the buyer's profits attained by contractually controlling quality can match those of any delegation arrangement. However, in practice, western buyers may also opt for delegating rather than controlling quality provision to their Chinese producers, which creates the need for a theoretical extension of the previous framework. In this article, we enrich the framework of information asymmetry by including expertise asymmetry, which reflects the producers' superior expertise in the production process. With expertise asymmetry, delegating quality may be beneficial as it allows the producer to leverage on his superior expertise and ultimately take more efficient quality decisions.
机译:加工贸易可能涉及买方与外国生产商签约,以将中间投入物加工和组装成最终产品。买方可以决定以合同方式控制或委派其产品的质量规定。质量控制似乎是显而易见的选择,尤其是在无法观察到生产者的生产能力的环境中。相应地,基于信息不对称的传统框架没有赋予质量委托任何价值,因为通过合同控制质量获得的买方利润可以与任何委托安排相匹配。但是,实际上,西方买家也可能选择委派而不是控制其中国生产商的质量供应,这需要从理论上扩展先前的框架。在本文中,我们通过包括专业知识不对称来丰富信息不对称的框架,这反映了生产者在生产过程中的卓越专业知识。由于专业知识的不对称性,委派质量可能是有益的,因为它使生产者可以利用其卓越的专业知识并最终做出更有效的质量决策。

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  • 来源
    《Decision Sciences》 |2018年第4期|728-753|共26页
  • 作者

    Letizia Paolo;

  • 作者单位

    Univ Tennessee, Stokely Management Ctr, Knoxville, TN 37996 USA;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
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