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Role of Random Capacity Risk and the Retailer in Decentralized Supply Chains with Competing Suppliers

机译：随机容量风险和零售商在竞争性供应商的分散式供应链中的作用

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摘要

This research considers a supply chain under the following conditions: (ⅰ) two heterogeneous suppliers are in competition, (ⅱ) supply capacity is random and pricing is endogenous, (ⅲ) consumer demand, with and without an intermediate retailer, is price dependent. Specifically, we examine how uncertainty in supply capacity affects optimal ordering and pricing decisions, supplier and retailer profits, and the incentives to reduce such uncertainty. When two suppliers sell through a monopolistic retailer, supply uncertainty not only affects the retailer's diversification strategy for replenishment, but also changes the suppliers' wholesale price competition and the incentive for reducing capacity uncertainty. In this dual-sourcing model, we show that the benefit of reducing capacity uncertainty depends on the cost heterogeneity between the suppliers. In addition, we show that a supplier does not necessarily benefit from capacity variability reduction. We contrast this incentive misalignment with findings from the single-supplier case and a supplier-duopoly case where both suppliers sell directly to market without the monopolistic retailer. In the latter single-supplier and duopoly cases, we prove that the unreliable supplier always benefits from reducing capacity variability. These results highlight the role of the retailer's diversification strategy in distorting a supplier's incentive for reducing capacity uncertainty under supplier price competition.
机译：这项研究考虑了以下条件下的供应链：（ⅰ）两个异质供应商处于竞争状态；（ⅱ）供应能力是随机的，价格是内生的；（ⅲ）有无中间零售商的消费者需求取决于价格。具体来说，我们研究了供应能力的不确定性如何影响最佳的订购和定价决策，供应商和零售商的利润以及减少此类不确定性的动机。当两个供应商通过一个垄断的零售商进行销售时，供应的不确定性不仅会影响零售商的补货多元化策略，而且还会改变供应商的批发价格竞争和减少产能不确定性的动机。在这种双重采购模型中，我们表明减少容量不确定性的好处取决于供应商之间的成本异质性。此外，我们证明了供应商不一定会受益于容量可变性的降低。我们将这种激励失调与单一供应商案例和供应商-垄断案例的发现进行对比，在该案例中，两个供应商都直接向市场出售而没有垄断零售商。在后一种单一供应商和双头垄断的情况下，我们证明了不可靠的供应商总是会受益于减少产能波动。这些结果凸显了零售商的多元化战略在扭曲供应商降低供应商价格竞争下容量不确定性的动机方面的作用。

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