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The Impact of Manufacturers' Wholesale Prices on a Retailer's Shelf-Space and Pricing Decisions

机译：制造商批发价格对零售商货架空间和定价决策的影响

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摘要

This article examines shelf-space allocation and pricing decisions in the marketing channel as the results of a static game played a la Stackelberg between two manufacturers of competing brands and one retailer. The competing manufacturers act as leaders that play a simultaneous and noncooperative game. They fix their transfer prices by taking into account the shelf-space allocation and price-markup decisions of their common exclusive dealer. The results indicate that the wholesale prices of brands are strongly linked to their share of the shelf. The main results of our numerical simulations may be summarized as follows: first, the lower the unit cost and/or the greater the price elasticity, the greater the shelf space allocated to that brand. Second, the higher the shelf-space elasticity, the lower are the wholesale prices and the profits of all channel members.
机译：本文研究了营销渠道中的货架空间分配和定价决策，因为静态游戏的结果在两个竞争品牌的制造商和一个零售商之间发挥了Stackelberg的作用。相互竞争的制造商充当领导者，扮演着同时且不合作的游戏。他们通过考虑普通独家经销商的货架空间分配和价格上涨决定来确定转让价格。结果表明，品牌的批发价格与其货架份额密切相关。我们的数值模拟的主要结果可以总结如下：首先，单位成本越低和/或价格弹性越大，则分配给该品牌的货架空间就越大。第二，货架空间的弹性越高，批发价格和所有渠道成员的利润就越低。

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