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Information Systems Project Continuation in Escalation Situations: A Real Options Model

机译：升级情况下的信息系统项目继续：实物期权模型

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摘要

Software project escalation has been shown to be a widespread phenomenon. With few exceptions, prior research has portrayed escalation as an irrational decision-making process whereby additional resources are plowed into a failing project. In this article, we examine the possibility that in some cases managers escalate their commitment not because they are acting irrationally, but rather as a rational response to real options that may be embedded in a project. A project embeds real options when managers have the opportunity but not the obligation to adjust the future direction of the project in response to external or internal events. Examples include deferring the project, switching the project to serve a different purpose, changing the scale of the project, implementing it in incremental stages, abandoning the project, or using the project as a platform for future growth opportunities. Although real options can represent a substantial portion of a project's value, they rarely enter into a project's formal justification process in the traditional quantitative discounted cash-flow-based project valuation techniques. Using experimental data collected from managers in 123 firms, we demonstrate that managers recognize and value the presence of real options. We also assess the relative importance that managers ascribe to each type of real option, showing that growth options are more highly valued than operational options. Finally, we demonstrate that the influence of the options on project continuation decisions is largely mediated by the perceived value that they add. Implications for both theory and practice are discussed.
机译：事实证明，软件项目升级是一种普遍现象。除少数例外，先前的研究将升级描述为一个不合理的决策过程，由此将更多的资源投入到失败的项目中。在本文中，我们研究了经理在某些情况下提升承诺的可能性，不是因为他们的行为不合理，而是作为对项目中可能包含的实际选择的理性反应。当经理有机会但无义务根据外部或内部事件调整项目的未来方向时，项目就会嵌入实际选择权。实例包括推迟项目，将项目转换为其他目的，更改项目规模，逐步实施，放弃项目或将项目用作未来增长机会的平台。尽管实物期权可以代表项目价值的很大一部分，但是它们很少采用传统的基于现金流量折现的定量项目估值技术来进入项目的正式论证过程。使用从123家公司的经理那里收集的实验数据，我们证明经理认识到并重视实物期权的存在。我们还评估了管理者对每种类型的实物期权的相对重要性，表明增长期权比运营期权的价值更高。最后，我们证明了选项对项目延续决策的影响很大程度上是由它们所增加的感知价值所介导的。讨论了对理论和实践的影响。

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