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Inducing Downstream Information Sharing via Manufacturer Information Acquisition and Retailer Subsidy

机译：通过制造商信息获取和零售商补贴诱导下游信息共享

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摘要

We investigate a manufacturer's information acquisition and subsidization strategies in a supply chain featuring two competing retailers who sell substitutable products and have private demand information. The manufacturer can decide whether to acquire demand information at a cost and further decide whether to offer subsidies simultaneously to retailers to induce their sharing of private demand information. We demonstrate that subsidizing retailers is always in the manufacturer's interest, but direct information acquisition is profitable only if its cost is low. Information acquisition helps the manufacturer gain superior demand information and leverages the retailer's information advantage, thereby reducing the expenditure of subsidization. Compared with the simultaneous subsidy provision scheme, we further investigate the sequential and partial subsidy schemes and find that the simultaneous and sequential subsidy schemes result in an identical equilibrium outcome that dominates the equilibrium outcome in the partial subsidy scheme when three subsidy provision schemes are all feasible. Although the outcomes are the same, we show that the simultaneous subsidy scheme can be applied in a broader range than the sequential subsidy scheme can. Otherwise, if complete information sharing cannot be achieved, the partial subsidy scheme may be the optimal choice for the manufacturer.
机译：我们调查制造商在供应链中的信息收购和补贴战略，其中包括两名竞争销售可替代产品并具有私人需求信息的竞争零售商。制造商可以决定是否以成本获取需求信息，并进一步决定是否同时向零售商提供补贴，以促使其共享私人需求信息。我们证明补贴零售商始终处于制造商的兴趣中，但只有当其成本低时，直接信息收购才能有利可图。信息收购有助于制造商获得优越的需求信息并利用零售商的信息优势，从而降低补贴支出。与同时补贴提供计划相比，我们进一步调查了顺序和部分补贴计划，并发现同时和顺序补贴方案导致相同的均衡结果，当三个补贴规定方案都是可行的。虽然结果是相同的，但我们表明同时补贴方案可以应用于比顺序补贴方案更广泛的范围。否则，如果无法实现完整的信息共享，部分补贴方案可能是制造商的最佳选择。

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  • 来源
    《Decision Line》 |2020年第3期|691-719|共29页
  • 作者

    Li Guo; Zheng Hong; Sethi Suresh P.; Guan Xu;

  • 作者单位

    Beijing Inst Technol Sch Management & Econ Beijing 100081 Peoples R China|Beijing Inst Technol Ctr Energy & Environm Policy Res Beijing 100081 Peoples R China|Sustainable Dev Res Inst Econ & Soc Beijing Beijing 100081 Peoples R China;

    Beijing Inst Technol Sch Management & Econ Beijing 100081 Peoples R China|Beijing Inst Technol Ctr Energy & Environm Policy Res Beijing 100081 Peoples R China|Sustainable Dev Res Inst Econ & Soc Beijing Beijing 100081 Peoples R China;

    Univ Texas Dallas Naveen Jindal Sch Management Richardson TX 75080 USA;

    Wuhan Univ Sch Econ & Management Wuhan 430072 Hubei Peoples R China;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Cournot Competition; Information Acquisition; Information Sharing; Subsidy; Supply Chain;

    机译：Cournot竞争;信息收购;信息共享;补贴;供应链;

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