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Binary Vickrey auction — A robust and efficient multi-unit sealed-bid online auction protocol against buyer multi-identity bidding

机译：Binary Vickrey拍卖-强大而有效的多单位密封投标在线拍卖协议，针对买方多身份投标

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The multi-unit Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism has two major weaknesses: it has high computational complexity and monotonicity problems [Paul Milgrom. Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2004] such that if goods are not substitutes for all bidders and if a bidder can submit bids under multiple identities, then the VCG is no longer strategy-proof. To address these two weaknesses, we introduce a Binary Vickrey Auction (BVA) where goods are allocated in bundles of sequentially-decreasing power-of-two items in multiple rounds. Because of the discrete allocation operations, the BVA is computationally efficient. It is also robust against buyer multi-identity bidding by discouraging a bidder splitting his single bid for a larger bundle into several bids under multiple bidder identities for smaller bundles because the BVA favors bids for larger bundles with earlier considerations and cheaper prices.
机译：多单元Vickrey-Clark-Groves（VCG）机制有两个主要缺点：计算复杂度高和单调性问题[Paul Milgrom。将拍卖理论付诸实践。剑桥大学出版社，英国剑桥，2004年]，因此，如果商品不能替代所有投标人，并且投标人可以多种身份提交投标书，那么VCG将不再具有战略意义。为了解决这两个弱点，我们引入了二进制维克雷拍卖（BVA），将商品分成多轮，依次递减两个项的乘方幂。由于离散分配操作，BVA在计算上是有效的。通过阻止投标者将他对较大捆绑商品的单个出价分成多个出价者身份的较小捆绑商品，这也对买方多身份出价很有效，因为BVA倾向于考虑较早考虑且价格较便宜的较大捆绑商品的出价。

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