Minimum Credible Deterrence

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Minimum Credible Deterrence

机译：最低可信威慑

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Anywhere in the world both tactical and strategic nuclear forces need to have a central command channel to ensure that nuclear forces that necessarily remain on a knife edge do not inadvertently cause a catastrophe triggered by an accident. In order to have absolute control over our nuclear deterrent, an "Air Force Strategic Command" was established in 1983, thereafter the Army's Strategic Command and the Naval Strategic Commands were created. Once Pakistan carried out its nuclear test in 1998, central coordination was necessary to oversee the employment, policy formulation, deployment, research and development, and operational command and control of Pakistan nuclear arsenals. The National Command Authority (NCA) was established in 2000 as the apex civilian-led command channel working directly under the Prime Minister.

机译：在世界上的任何地方，战术和战略核力量都需要有一个中央指挥通道，以确保必然留在刀刃上的核力量不会无意中引起事故引发的灾难。为了完全控制我们的核威慑力量，1983年成立了“空军战略司令部”，此后陆军的战略司令部和海军战略司令部也成立了。巴基斯坦于1998年进行核试验后，必须进行中央协调，以监督巴基斯坦核武库的使用，政策制定，部署，研究与开发以及作战指挥与控制。国家指挥部（NCA）成立于2000年，是由总理直接领导的最高平民领导的指挥渠道。

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《Defence journal》 |2015年第5期|74-75|共2页
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Minimum Credible Deterrence

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