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Missile warfare and violent non-state actors: the case of Hezbollah

机译：导弹战和非国家暴力行为者：真主党

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Over the last three decades, Hezbollah adapted its military strategy and the operational function conferred to its missiles. Starting in 1992, rocket warfare became one of the primary tactics of the group to compel Israeli Forces in Lebanon. After the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, the strategy evolved into a deterrence posture to support the Party's objective to remain the primary military power inside Lebanon. Hezbollah's posture could serve as a template for smaller terrorist groups. It would broaden the array of strategic options for violent non-state actors, allowing them to implement military postures that could be described as rudimentary and low-cost denial of access strategies. However, this scenario would require the same level of state support that Hezbollah currently enjoys from Iran, and that other non-state actors (Hamas, Houthi insurgents) do not at this stage.
机译：在过去的三十年中，真主党调整了其军事战略，并将其作战职能赋予了导弹。从1992年开始，火箭战成为该组织强迫以色列驻黎巴嫩部队的主要战术之一。以色列在2000年撤军后，该战略演变成威慑态势，以支持该党保持在黎巴嫩境内主要军事力量的目标。真主党的立场可以作为较小的恐怖组织的榜样。它将扩大暴力非国家行为者的战略选择范围，使他们能够采取军事姿态，这可被描述为基本和低成本的拒绝进入战略。但是，这种情况将需要真主党目前从伊朗获得的同等水平的国家支持，而其他非国家行为者（哈马斯，胡西叛乱分子）在现阶段则不需要。

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