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(Un)justified expectations on nuclear deterrence of non-nuclear NATO members: the case of Estonia and Latvia?

机译：对无核北约成员的核威慑的（非）合理的期望：爱沙尼亚和拉脱维亚的情况？

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摘要

Nuclear assets are one of the cornerstones of credible collective deterrence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Paradoxically, the most endangered member states are the ones without nuclear capabilities, left with the hope and expectation that the owners of nuclear assets will defend them and that their potential enemies are deterred by these capabilities. However, the expectations from one side, practical commitment of allies from other side may not go in harmony and synchronisation. Is there a capability gap which needs to be fulfilled? If yes then, is the gap in the side of nuclear powers or is it on the side of those endangered states who need to understand what can or cannot realistically be expected? The current article focuses on the question of how the political and military elite of the Baltic states describes their expectations in terms of using Alliance's nuclear capabilities to deter Russia's regional ambitions.
机译：核资产是北大西洋公约组织可信的集体威慑的基石之一。矛盾的是，最危险的成员国是那些没有核能力的成员国，他们怀着希望和期望，拥有核资产的所有者将捍卫它们，而其潜在敌人却被这些能力所阻止。但是，一方面的期望，另一方的盟国的实际承诺可能不会协调一致。是否存在需要弥补的能力差距？如果是，那么是在核大国方面还是在那些濒临灭绝的国家一边，它们需要了解现实中可以预期或无法预期的方面？本文主要关注波罗的海国家的政治和军事精英如何利用联盟的核能力阻止俄罗斯的区域野心来描述他们的期望。

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