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Fault analysis of Trivium

机译：Trivium故障分析

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As a hardware-oriented stream cipher, Trivium is on the edge of low cost and compactness. In this paper we discuss how brittle Trivium is under fault attack. Our fault model is based on the following two assumptions: (1) We can make fault injection on the state at a random time and (2) after each fault injection, the fault positions are from random one of three registers, and from a random area within eight neighboring bits. Our fault model has extremely weak assumptions for effective attack , and much weaker than that of Hojsik and Rudolf, in their fault attack on Trivium. We present a checking method such that, by observing original key-stream segment and fault injected key-stream segment, the injecting time and fault positions can be determined. Then, for several distributions of the injecting time, our random simulations always show that the attacker can break Trivium by a small number of repeated fault injections. For example, suppose that the injecting time has an uniform distribution over {0, 1,..., 32}, then averagely no more than 16 repeated fault injection procedures will break Trivium, by averagely observing no more than 195 × 17 key-stream bits.
机译：作为面向硬件的流密码，Trivium处于低成本和紧凑的边缘。在本文中，我们讨论了脆性Trivium如何受到故障攻击。我们的故障模型基于以下两个假设：（1）我们可以在随机时间对状态进行故障注入，并且（2）每次故障注入后，故障位置都来自三个寄存器中的任意一个，并且来自随机八个相邻位内的区域。我们的故障模型对有效攻击的假设非常薄弱，并且比Hojsik和Rudolf对Trivium的故障攻击要弱得多。我们提出一种检查方法，通过观察原始关键流段和故障注入的关键流段，可以确定注入时间和故障位置。然后，对于注入时间的几种分布，我们的随机模拟始终表明，攻击者可以通过少量重复的故障注入来破坏Trivium。例如，假设注入时间在{0，1，...，32}上具有均匀的分布，那么平均观察到不超过195×17键，则平均不超过16个重复的故障注入过程将破坏Trivium。流位。

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