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Entry deterring effects of contractual relations in the dairy processing sector

机译:进入抑制奶制品加工部门合同关系的影响

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The European Commission has launched the so-called “milk package” in October 2012 that allows Member States to require compulsory written contracts between milk producers and investor-owned processors. We argue that compulsory contracts have anticompetitive effects when they are exclusive in the sense that they comprise the obligation to supply to the contractor only. The objective of this paper is to set up a game theoretic model to analyze imperfect competition on the raw milk market that may result from entry deterring effects of exclusive contracts between dairy producers and processors. Building on the antitrust literature, the model incorporates the specific characteristics of the milk market and considers the risk attitude of milk producers and uncertainty of a rival dairy’s market entry. Under certain combinations of probability of the rival’s market entry and risk aversion of the producer, an incumbent can deter market entry by offering an exclusive contract.
机译:欧盟委员会于2012年10月启动了所谓的“牛奶包”,使成员国能够要求牛奶生产商与投资者拥有的加工商之间签订强制性书面合同。我们认为,强制性合同在具有排他性的意义上具有反竞争效果,因为强制性合同仅构成向承包商供应的义务。本文的目的是建立一个博弈论模型,以分析由于乳制品生产商和加工商之间的排他性合同的进入而产生的不完全竞争,可能会导致原料奶市场上的不完全竞争。该模型以反托拉斯文献为基础,结合了牛奶市场的特定特征,并考虑了牛奶生产商的风险态度和竞争对手乳品市场准入的不确定性。在竞争对手进入市场的可能性和生产者的风险规避的特定组合下,任职者可以通过提供独家合同来阻止市场进入。

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