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首页> 外文期刊>Corporate Board: Role, Duties & Composition >PRIVATE BENEFITS AND BOARD SIZE: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE
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PRIVATE BENEFITS AND BOARD SIZE: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

机译：私人利益和董事会规模：国际证据

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摘要

In our analyses of 10,390 companies from 51 countries, we find that in countries that have small capital markets free cash flow is positively related to board size. However, this positive relation becomes significantly weak for companies in large securities markets. This result suggests that managers in underdeveloped capital markets have an incentive to construct less effective boards to extract private benefits. However, the distorted managerial incentive is alleviated in developed countries that have various disciplinary mechanisms to ensure good governance practices. We do not find clear evidence that legal protection of shareholder rights mitigates the managerial incentive to construct less effective boards.
机译：在对来自51个国家的10,390家公司的分析中，我们发现在资本市场较小的国家，自由现金流与董事会规模成正比。但是，对于大型证券市场中的公司来说，这种正向关系变得非常薄弱。这一结果表明，不发达资本市场的经理人有动力建立效率较低的董事会以获取私人利益。但是，在具有各种纪律机制以确保良好治理实践的发达国家中，扭曲的管理激励措施得到了缓解。我们没有找到明确的证据表明对股东权益的法律保护会减轻管理人员对建立效率较低的董事会的动机。

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