首页> 外文期刊>Advances in decision sciences >A formulation of combinatorial auction via reverse convex programming
【24h】

A formulation of combinatorial auction via reverse convex programming

机译:通过反向凸规划制定组合拍卖

获取原文
           

摘要

In combinatorial auctions, buyers and sellers bid not only for single items but also for combinations (or “bundles”, or “baskets”) of items. Clearing the auction is in general an NP-hard problem; it is usually solved with integer linear programming. We proposed in an earlier paper a continuous approximationof this problem, where orders are aggregated and integrality constraints are relaxed. It was proved that this problem could be solved efficiently in two steps by calculating two fixed points, first the fixed point of a contraction mapping, and then of a set-valued function. In this paper, we generalize the problem to incorporate constraints on maximum price changes between two auction rounds. This generalized problem cannot be solved by the aforementioned methods and necessitates reverse convex programming techniques.
机译:在组合拍卖中,买卖双方不仅为单个物品竞标,还为物品的组合(或“捆绑”或“篮子”)竞标。清除拍卖通常是一个NP难题。通常用整数线性规划来解决。我们在较早的论文中提出了这个问题的连续近似方法,在该方法中,订单被汇总,完整性约束被放宽。事实证明,可以通过计算两个固定点(首先是收缩映射的固定点,然后是集值函数)来分两步有效解决此问题。在本文中,我们对问题进行了概括,以纳入对两个拍卖回合之间最大价格变化的约束。该一般问题不能通过前述方法解决,并且需要反向凸编程技术。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号