One not-so-intuitive result in auction theory is the revenueequivalence theorem, which states that as long as an auctioncomplies with some conditions, it will on average generate thesame revenue to an auctioneer as the revenue generated by anyother auction that complies with them. Surprisingly, the conditionsare not defined on the payment rules to the bidders but on thefact that the bidders do not bid below a reserve value—set bythe auctioneer—the winner is the one with the highest bidding andthere is a common equilibrium bidding function used by all bidders. Inthis paper, we verify such result using extensive simulation of abroad range of auctions and focus on the variability orfluctuations of the results around the average. Such fluctuationsare observed and measured in two dimensions for each type ofauction: as the number of auctions grows and as the number ofbidders increases.
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