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首页> 外文期刊>American journal of applied sciences >On the Evolutionary Fitness of Bounded Rationality: Heterogeneous Populations in Antagonistic Interactions | Science Publications
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On the Evolutionary Fitness of Bounded Rationality: Heterogeneous Populations in Antagonistic Interactions | Science Publications

机译：有界理性的进化适应性：对立相互作用中的异质种群科学出版物

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> Conventional game theory assumes hyper-rational players, while evolutionary game theory abandons the assumption. This paper studies what happens when agents of both profiles co-exist and get engaged in a series of antagonistic interactions (the Hawk-Dove game). It is shown that if rational agents are perfectly informed as to the type of their opponent, they find it optimal to always be aggressive (that is, always select ?Hawk?) when paired with an irrational player. It is then shown that, generally, a similar result is also valid when rational agents fail to recognise the type of their opponent with certainty. Finally, a discussion on why it may be fruitful to consider populations heterogeneous as to the rationality of agents is provided.
机译： >传统博弈论假设超理性参与者，而进化博弈论则放弃该假设。本文研究了两种情况的特工共存并进行一系列拮抗作用时所发生的情况（Hawk-Dove游戏）。结果表明，如果理性代理人能够很好地了解其对手的类型，那么他们会发现与非理性玩家配对时，总是具有攻击性（即始终选择“鹰”）是最佳选择。然后表明，通常，当有理行为主体无法确定地识别其对手的类型时，类似的结果也是有效的。最后，提供了关于为什么考虑群体在代理人合理性方面可能是富有成效的讨论。

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