...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Information >Game Analysis of Access Control Based on User Behavior Trust
【24h】

Game Analysis of Access Control Based on User Behavior Trust

机译：基于用户行为信任的访问控制博弈分析

获取原文
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Due to the dynamics and uncertainty of the current network environment, access control is one of the most important factors in guaranteeing network information security. How to construct a scientific and accurate access control model is a current research focus. In actual access control mechanisms, users with high trust values bring better benefits, but the losses will also be greater once cheating access is adopted. A general access control game model that can reflect both trust and risk is established in this paper. First, we construct an access control game model with user behavior trust between the user and the service provider, in which the benefits and losses are quantified by using adaptive regulatory factors and the user’s trust level, which enhances the rationality of the policy making. Meanwhile, we present two kinds of solutions for the prisoner’s dilemma in the traditional access control game model without user behavior trust. Then, due to the vulnerability of trust, the user’s trust value is updated according to the interaction situation in the previous stage, which ensures that the updating of the user’s trust value can satisfy the “slow rising-fast falling” principle. Theoretical analysis and the simulation experiment both show that this model has a better performance than a traditional game model and can guarantee scientific decision-making in the access control mechanism.
机译：由于当前网络环境的变化和不确定性，访问控制是保证网络信息安全的最重要因素之一。如何构建科学，准确的访问控制模型是当前研究的重点。在实际的访问控制机制中，具有较高信任值的用户可以带来更好的收益，但是一旦采用欺诈性访问，损失也会更大。本文建立了一个既可以反映信任度又可以反映风险的通用访问控制博弈模型。首先，我们构建了一个具有用户与服务提供商之间的用户行为信任的访问控制游戏模型，该模型通过使用自适应监管因素和用户的信任程度来量化收益和损失，从而增强了决策的合理性。同时，针对没有用户行为信任的传统访问控制游戏模型，我们针对囚徒困境提出了两种解决方案。然后，由于信任的脆弱性，根据前一阶段的交互情况来更新用户的信任值，从而确保用户的信任值的更新能够满足“慢起落落”的原则。理论分析和仿真实验均表明，该模型具有比传统博弈模型更好的性能，可以保证访问控制机制的科学决策。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号