...
首页> 外文期刊>International Journal of Finance and Accounting >A Conceptual Review of Agency Models of Performance Evaluation
【24h】

A Conceptual Review of Agency Models of Performance Evaluation

机译:绩效评估代理模型的概念回顾

获取原文
           

摘要

The contract existing between agent and principal in most cases does not yield the maximum satisfaction to both the principal and the agent due to dysfunctional behaviour. While the principal requires the maximum effort and cooperation of the agent to achieve his/her goal in the contract, the agent on other hand may be confronted with personal desires which often conflict with the goal of the agency contract. In order to achieve an optimal risk sharing position where both the principal and the agent will simultaneously attain their goal in the relationship, there is need for a framework or model which can be used to develop the necessary management control structures that will facilitate the achievement of goal congruence. The objective of the paper therefore, is to examine agency models by providing the conceptual and theoretical perspective as well as review some outstanding studies in the area with a view to appreciates its applicability to solving agency problems. From the review, we observed that agency models provides a coherent framework which can be used to analyse managerial accounting issues and can therefore be argued for adoption when investigating agent-principal problems facing firms.
机译:在大多数情况下,由于行为失常,代理人与委托人之间存在的合同不能使委托人和代理人获得最大的满意。尽管委托人需要代理商的最大努力和合作才能实现他/她的合同目标,但另一方面,代理商可能会遇到个人需求,这常常与代理商合同的目标相抵触。为了在委托人和代理人同时实现其在关系中的目标的过程中获得最佳的风险分担头寸,需要一个可用于开发必要的管理控制结构的框架或模型,该结构或模型将有助于实现以下目标:目标一致性。因此,本文的目的是通过提供概念和理论观点来审查代理模型,并回顾该领域的一些杰出研究,以期认识其在解决代理问题中的适用性。从评论中,我们观察到代理模型提供了一个连贯的框架,可用于分析管理会计问题,因此在调查企业所面临的代理人-主要问题时可以被认为可以采用。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号