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首页> 外文期刊>Economies >Can Courts Make Federalism Work? A Game Theory Approach to Court-Induced Compliance and Defection in Federal Systems
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Can Courts Make Federalism Work? A Game Theory Approach to Court-Induced Compliance and Defection in Federal Systems

机译：法院可以使联邦制起作用吗？联邦系统中法院诱导的合规与叛逃的博弈论方法

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Few studies on federalism analyze the role of courts as safeguards of the federal arrangement, and those that do tend to be too optimistic about what courts can do. This article analyzes the effect of judicial review on the interaction between the central and a regional government in a federation in order to understand the conditions under which courts may or may not enforce compliance with federalism. It argues that politicians of either level of government anticipate the likelihood of a judicial challenge and an eventual veto, and it finds distinct equilibria in the interaction between central and regional governments (imposition, auto-limitation, negotiation and litigation). Only under auto-limitation do courts effectively prevent transgressions to the federal arrangement. In all other scenarios, defection may take place despite the presence of courts. These findings show that as the court’s jurisprudence becomes more solid and defined, the chances for governments to successfully exceed their powers increase. Not only do transgressions take place despite the presence of the court, but because of it.
机译：很少有关于联邦制的研究分析法院作为联邦安排的保障措施的作用，而那些确实对法院可以做的事情过于乐观的研究。本文分析了司法审查对联邦中央政府与地方政府之间互动的影响，以了解法院在何种条件下可以强制执行联邦制，也可以不强制执行联邦制。它认为，各级政府的政治人物都预见到司法挑战和最终否决的可能性，并且在中央政府与地方政府之间的互动（强制，自动限制，谈判和诉讼）中找到了明显的平衡点。只有在自动限制的情况下，法院才能有效地防止违反联邦的安排。在所有其他情况下，尽管有法院存在，仍可能发生叛逃。这些发现表明，随着法院的判例变得更加扎实和明确，政府成功超越其职权的机会也会增加。尽管存在法院，但不仅发生了违法行为，而且正因为如此。

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