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首页> 外文期刊>Energies >A Stackelberg Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentive Effects under Perceived Risk for China’s Straw-Based Power Plant Supply Chain
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A Stackelberg Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentive Effects under Perceived Risk for China’s Straw-Based Power Plant Supply Chain

机译：基于秸秆发电厂供应链的风险感知下激励效应的Stackelberg博弈理论分析

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The rapid expansion of the biomass power generation industry has resulted in the conversion of substantial agricultural waste (crop straw) into energy feedstock, thereby increasing the income of farmers and promoting the development of rural areas. However, the promising industry faces financial deficits because of difficulties in collecting straw from farmers. To determine strategies for overcoming the biomass supply problem, we apply Stackelberg game theory in modeling the Chinese biomass supply chain and design incentive scenarios under stakeholder risk perception. We illustrate the proposed methodology through an empirical case study on China and demonstrate the effects of incentives on farmers and middlemen. Results show that with incentives, straw quantity and stakeholder profit are expected to increase. Incentives exert a particularly remarkable effect on farmers, with such inducements producing the highest social welfare. Moreover, perceived risk dramatically affects stakeholder profit. Mitigating the risk perception of farmers is expected to significantly advance the development of the biomass power generation industry, increase stakeholder profit, and decrease the amount of incentives needed.
机译：生物质发电产业的迅速发展导致大量的农业废弃物（农作物秸秆）转化为能源原料，从而增加了农民的收入并促进了农村地区的发展。然而，由于难以从农民那里收集秸秆，有前途的行业面临财政赤字。为了确定解决生物质供应问题的策略，我们将Stackelberg博弈论应用于中国生物质供应链的建模和利益相关者风险感知下的激励情景设计。我们通过对中国的案例研究说明了拟议的方法，并论证了激励措施对农民和中间商的影响。结果表明，有了激励措施，秸秆数量和利益相关者利润有望增加。激励措施对农民产生了特别显着的影响，这种诱因产生了最高的社会福利。此外，感知到的风险会极大地影响利益相关者的利润。减轻农民的风险意识有望大大促进生物质发电行业的发展，增加利益相关者的利润，并减少所需的激励措施。

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