• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Frontiers in Public Health >Restricted Science
【24h】

Restricted Science

机译：受限科学

获取原文
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

In 2004, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) was created as an independent federal advisory body. Its role was to advise the U.S. government on strategies to prevent the misuse of dual-use research. Since its inception, the NSABB has ruled on two cases: the 1918 flu-virus synthesis conducted by government scientists in 2005 and the H5N1 experiment conducted in 2011 by two separate university teams in the Netherlands and the United States. While in the first case, without much public debate, the NSABB quickly decided to support publication of the experiment’s findings, in the second case, it initially requested a halt on publication and the removal of methodological details from the proposed articles for fear that they could be used by malevolent actors to create a pandemic among humans. The decision was reversed 6 months later, but it sparked a worldwide firestorm, engaging the scientific and security communities in a heated debate about whether the dissemination of scientific data should be regulated, and what types of research should be conducted. Yet, the key question that triggered the overall controversy remains largely ignored: under what conditions could the H5N1 experiment be reproduced, if at all, by malevolent actors using only published data?
机译：2004年，国家生物安全科学咨询委员会（NSABB）成立，是一个独立的联邦咨询机构。其作用是就防止双重用途研究的滥用的策略向美国政府提供建议。自成立以来，NSABB已裁定两个案件：政府科学家在2005年进行的1918年流感病毒合成以及荷兰和美国两个独立的大学团队在2011年进行的H5N1实验。在第一种情况下，在没有太多公开辩论的情况下，NSABB迅速决定支持发表实验结果，而在第二种情况下，NSABB最初要求停止发表并从建议的文章中删除方法上的细节，因为担心它们可能被恶毒的演员用来在人类之间造成大流行。 6个月后，该决定被撤消，但引发了一场全球性大火，使科学和安全界参与了关于是否应规范科学数据的传播以及应进行何种类型的研究的激烈辩论。但是，引发总体争议的关键问题仍被很大程度上忽略：在什么条件下，如果恶意的演员仅使用已发布的数据，就可以复制H5N1实验（如果有的话）？

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号