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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BALKAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, CASE OF ALBANIA

机译：阿尔巴尼亚案例：巴尔干金融机构的公司治理

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Corporate governance has at its backbone a set of transparent relationships between an institution’s management, its board, shareholders and other stakeholders. In this article, in the first part, the nature and purpose of corporate governance has been discussed with special emphasis on the problems of banks in the field of corporate governance. Corporate governance involves regulatory and market mechanisms, and the roles and relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders, and the goals for which the corporation is governed. Lately, corporate governance has been comprehensively defined as "a system of law and sound approaches by which corporations are directed and controlled focusing on the internal and external corporate structures with the intention of monitoring the actions of management and directors and thereby mitigating agency risks which may stem from the misdeeds of corporate officers. The financial crisis exposed flaws throughout financial markets and prompted much investigation into the way banks work. The ‘2008 crisis in the financial industry, among other causes, brought to light the conflict of interest between achieving aggressive results by the executives in order to obtain bonuses and the long-term risk associated with the commercial company in its business. This paper focuses on one line of investigation—the corporate governance of banks. It examines why governance of banks differs from governance of nonfinancial firms and where the governance of banks failed during the crisis; it also offers recommendations for improving the governance system. Bank governance has been the topic of much recent academic work and policy discussion (Senior Supervisors Group 2008, 2009; Walker Report 2009; Committee of European Banking Supervisors 2010). Because of their contemporaneous nature, there has been little connection between the academic approach and policy analysis. The purpose of this paper is to make such connections and ground the policy debate on scientific evidence. The Corporate Governance in banks is one of the most important discussions overall the world, being reinforced especially after the crises period. It is related with the sensitive situation and the stage of developments of the local economy and moreover with the impact of the crises that is still ongoing. As an answer, during late 2008 and beginning 2009, it has been noticed a fast reaction and total focus from all banks on building (if missing) and improving their structures of Corporate Governance. The liquidity problems suddenly affecting the banking sector constrained Banks to enlarge their activities / operations and forced them in better evaluating their investments. The importance of a strong financial sector in impacting the country’s economy growth through both level of banking development and stock market liquidity (Levine and Sara Zervos 1996, 1998) is quite evident even in the developing countries. Moreover, Peter Rousseau and Watchel (2000) findings’ confirm the positive impact of the stock market activity and the banking development. For this reason the governments in the developing countries are insisting in increasing credits of banks towards the private firms. The banking system in Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Albania has certain similarities in terms of development stage, related with the economic growth rate as well. The banking system, there is operating for more than 100 years instead of 15-20 years of development in the remaining countries.
机译：公司治理的核心是机构管理层，董事会，股东和其他利益相关者之间的一系列透明关系。在本文的第一部分中，我们讨论了公司治理的性质和目的，特别着重于银行在公司治理领域中的问题。公司治理涉及监管和市场机制，以及公司管理层，董事会，股东和其他利益相关者之间的角色和关系，以及公司治理的目标。最近，公司治理已被广泛定义为“一种法律和合理方法体系，通过该体系，公司可以集中于内部和外部公司结构来进行指导和控制，以监控管理层和董事的行为，从而减轻可能会降低公司代理风险的风险。金融危机暴露了整个金融市场的缺陷，促使人们对银行的运作方式进行了广泛调查。2008年的金融业危机揭示了取得积极成果之间的利益冲突。为了获得奖金和与商业公司业务有关的长期风险，企业高管们进行了研究，本文重点研究了一条调查线，即银行的公司治理，研究了银行治理为何不同于非金融公司的治理以及在危机期间银行治理失败的地方;提供了完善治理系统的建议。银行治理一直是近期学术研究和政策讨论的主题（2008年，高级监管人员小组; 2009年; 2009年《沃克报告》; 2010年欧洲银行业监管者委员会）。由于它们的同时性，学术方法与政策分析之间几乎没有联系。本文的目的是建立这种联系并使政策辩论基于科学证据。银行的公司治理是整个世界上最重要的讨论之一，尤其是在危机时期之后，这种讨论得到了加强。这与当地经济的敏感局面和发展阶段有关，而且与仍在持续的危机影响有关。答案是，在2008年末至2009年年初，所有银行都迅速做出反应，并全力以赴致力于建立（如果缺少）和改善其公司治理结构。流动性问题突然影响到银行业，这迫使银行扩大了活动/业务，并迫使他们更好地评估其投资。即使在发展中国家，强大的金融部门对于通过银行发展水平和股票市场流动性来影响国家经济增长的重要性也很明显（Levine and Sara Zervos 1996，1998）。此外，Peter Rousseau and Watchel（2000）的发现证实了股市活动和银行业发展的积极影响。因此，发展中国家的政府坚持要增加银行对私人公司的信贷。保加利亚，罗马尼亚，塞尔维亚和阿尔巴尼亚的银行体系在发展阶段方面具有一定的相似性，也与经济增长率有关。银行系统已经运行了100多年，而不是在其余国家/地区发展15-20年的时间。

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