...
首页> 外文期刊>Sustainability >Evolutionary Game Analysis of Remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information
【24h】

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information

机译:信息不对称的再制造闭环供应链演化博弈分析

获取原文
           

摘要

Remanufacturing is an effective means to realize energy saving and emission reduction. This paper develops an evolutionary game model with a two-echelon closed-loop supply chain to study evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of manufacturers and retailers. Through analyzing evolutionary path of the game, we find that there are two possible evolutionary results affected by the profits of manufacturers. Price of remanufacturing products may be a critical factor that determines the ESS. Government subsidy is critical to promote the development of remanufacturing industry.
机译:再制造是实现节能减排的有效手段。本文建立了具有两级闭环供应链的演化博弈模型,以研究制造商和零售商的演化稳定策略(ESS)。通过分析游戏的演化路径,我们发现有两种可能的演化结果受到制造商利润的影响。再制造产品的价格可能是决定ESS的关键因素。政府补贴对于促进再制造产业的发展至关重要。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号