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Study of signalling games on the labour force market of EU-27, the pure strategy case

机译:纯战略案例研究欧盟27国劳动力市场上的信号博弈

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The paper addresses several key issues in the field of game theory, namely: determination of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium for signaling games - the pure strategy case; signaling on the labor force market; application of the signaling game on the labor force market of EU-27. The analysis of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium for signaling games - the pure strategy case has lead to the following conclusion: if the Sender strategy is unifying or separating then the equilibrium will be called unifying or, respectively separating. In the section Signaling on the labor force market, there are issues regarding the complete information case, where we suppose that the worker’s ability is common information for all players, but also issues regarding the incomplete information case. Three types of perfect Bayesian equilibriums may exist in this last model: unifying equilibrium, when both types of workers choose a single type of education; separating equilibrium, when the perfect Bayesian equilibrium is separating by itself, and hybrid equilibrium, if a worker chooses a level of education with certainty, the other one may randomly choose between joining the fist one (by selecting the level of education of the first type) and getting separated from him (by selecting a different level of education). This analysis allows us to draw the following conclusions: in case of signaling games on the labor force market, the pure strategy case, three types of equilibriums are available: unifying, separating and hybrid; as the worker’s ability is private information, this allows a low ability worker to pretend to be a high ability worker; the low ability workers find it more difficult to accumulate additional education requiring higher wages in return; besides the classical separating equilibrium, same as for the unifying equilibrium, there are other separating equilibriums implying a different educational choice by the high ability worker; sometimes the separating equilibrium becomes the limit of the hybrid equilibrium. The application is meant to strengthen, at least partially, given the lack of consistent data, the theoretical results.
机译:本文讨论了博弈论领域中的几个关键问题,即:确定信号博弈的理想贝叶斯均衡-纯策略案例;向劳动力市场发出信号;信号游戏在欧盟27国劳动力市场上的应用。对信号博弈的理想贝叶斯均衡的分析-纯策略案例得出以下结论:如果发件人策略是统一的或分离的,则均衡将被称为统一的或分离的。在“劳动力市场的信号传递”部分中,存在有关完整信息案例的问题,在该案例中,我们假定工人的能力是所有参与者的共同信息,但也涉及不完整信息案例的问题。在最后一个模型中,可能存在三种类型的完美贝叶斯均衡:统一均衡,当两种类型的工人都选择一种教育类型时;分离均衡时,当完美的贝叶斯均衡自身与混合均衡分离时,如果工人确定地选择教育水平,则另一人可以在加入拳头之间随机选择(通过选择第一类教育水平) )并与他分离(通过选择不同的教育水平)。这种分析使我们得出以下结论:在劳动力市场上的信号博弈的情况下,在纯战略的情况下,可以使用三种类型的均衡:统一,分离和混合。由于工作人员的能力是私人信息,因此,低能力工作人员可以假装为高能力工作人员;能力低下的工人发现很难积累额外的教育,而这需要更高的工资作为回报;除了经典的分离均衡之外,与统一的均衡一样,还有其他的分离均衡,这意味着高技能工人有不同的教育选择。有时,分离均衡成为混合均衡的极限。鉴于缺乏一致的数据,该应用旨在至少部分地增强理论结果。

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