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首页> 外文期刊>Theoretical Economics Letters >An Application of Principal Agent Theory to Contractual Hiring Arrangements within Public Sector Organizations
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An Application of Principal Agent Theory to Contractual Hiring Arrangements within Public Sector Organizations

机译:委托代理理论在公共部门组织合同聘用安排中的应用

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摘要

This paper critically examines the application of principal agent theory to contractual hiring arrangements of employees in public sector organizations as a contemporary alternative recruitment strategy. Globally, developed and developing nations within the public sector are seeking ways where they can reduce public expenditure and debt while at the same time attempting to increase productivity and efficiency gains by using cost containment initiatives. Thus, private sector methods of outsourcing and contracting are identified as more economically feasible strategies given global recessions and other budgetary constraints within these public agencies. Hence, public management and administration scholars have alluded to the catchy phrase of “doing more with less” (see [1]). Thus, the paper from a theoretically exploratory perspective analyzes how principal agent theory can be applied to the hiring of contingent employees within this sector and the agency problems that may likely arise as a result of these arrangements and their probable economic implications for the said sector.
机译:本文批判性地考察了委托代理理论在公共部门组织中雇员的合同雇用安排中的应用,这是一种当代的替代性雇用策略。在全球范围内,公共部门中的发达国家和发展中国家都在寻找减少公共支出和债务的方式,同时尝试通过成本控制措施来提高生产率和效率。因此,鉴于全球衰退和这些公共机构内的其他预算限制,将私营部门的外包和签约方法确定为在经济上更可行的策略。因此,公共管理和行政学者提到了“少花钱多办事”的口号(见[1])。因此,本文从理论探索的角度分析了委托代理理论如何应用于该部门内的临时雇员的雇用,以及由于这些安排及其对所述部门可能产生的经济影响而可能引起的代理问题。

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