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Dynamic Pricing Based on Strategic Consumers and Substitutes in a Duopoly Setting

机译:双头垄断下基于战略消费者和替代者的动态定价。

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Based on the rational strategic consumers, we construct a dynamic game to build a two-period dynamic pricing model for two brands of substitutes which are sold by duopoly. The solution concept of the dynamic game is Nash equilibrium. In our model, consumers have been clearly segmented into several consumption classes, according to their expected value of the products. The two competing firms enter a pricing game and finally reach the state of Nash equilibrium. In addition, decision-making process with only myopic consumers existing in the market is analyzed. To make the paper more practical and realistic, the condition, in which the myopic and strategic consumers both exist in the market, is also considered and studied. In order to help the readers understand better and make it intuitively more clearly, a numerical example is given to describe the influence of the main parameters to the optimal prices. The result indicates that, to maintain the firms’ respective optimal profits, the prices of the products should be adjusted appropriately with the changes of product differentiation coefficient.
机译:基于理性的战略消费者,我们构建了一个动态博弈模型,为双寡头出售的两个替代品牌建立了一个为期两期间的动态定价模型。动态博弈的解决方案概念是纳什均衡。在我们的模型中,根据消费者对产品的期望值,他们将消费者明确划分为几个消费类别。两家竞争公司进入定价游戏,最终达到纳什均衡状态。此外,分析了市场上仅存在近视消费者的决策过程。为了使本文更加实用和现实,还考虑并研究了近视和战略消费者同时存在于市场中的条件。为了帮助读者更好地理解并直观地理解,给出了一个数值示例来描述主要参数对最优价格的影响。结果表明,为了保持企业各自的最优利润,应根据产品差异系数的变化适当调整产品价格。

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