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首页> 外文期刊>Discrete dynamics in nature and society >Motivation Mechanism Prevents Adverse Selection in Industrial Technology Innovation Strategic Alliance
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Motivation Mechanism Prevents Adverse Selection in Industrial Technology Innovation Strategic Alliance

机译：激励机制防止产业技术创新战略联盟的逆向选择

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摘要

Choosing proper partners is the key to the success of the alliance. Based on the analysis of the characters of the Industrial Technology Innovation Strategic Alliance, a new kind of cooperative organization occurred in China in recent years. The problem of “adverse selection” at the stage of the its establishment is discussed in this paper. The game model is built based on motivation theory and the principle-agent theory and then proved by examples. The conclusions can be got from the model. By setting the ranges of funds, preferential policy, and sharable profits and designing membership rules, the organizer of the Industrial Technology Innovation Strategic Alliance can motivate the risk neutral applicant to reveal his real capacity and the one with higher capacity to participate intothe alliance more actively and even can set capacity threshold for applicants implicitly.
机译：选择合适的合作伙伴是联盟成功的关键。通过对产业技术创新战略联盟特征的分析，近年来在中国出现了一种新型的合作组织。本文讨论了“逆向选择”在其建立阶段的问题。基于激励理论和委托代理理论建立了博弈模型，并通过实例进行了证明。可以从模型中得出结论。通过设置资金范围，优惠政策和可分享的利润并设计会员资格规则，工业技术创新战略联盟的组织者可以激励风险中立的申请人展示其真实能力和能力更高的人更积极地加入联盟甚至可以隐式设置申请人的容量阈值。

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